It is very common today that people accuse each other of being Putin’s agents or at least useful idiots. In general this is seldom based on an in-depths analysis with a wide range of details forming a complex picture. Usually the level of already successful subversion which dominates the discourse is underestimated or folks are not aware something like that exists. It is indeed eye-opening to listen today to the dire warnings of KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov who described the dangers of ideological subversion in the 1980’s. We see the results with wokeism and cancel culture which distract us as indivuals and as citizens of a nation. Bezmenov recommended to watch what happens at universities and forget about the Hollywood nonsense of James Bond movies. Armchair agents in mainstream media use to do the exact opposite and boast about it with clichees when a story about a female GRU agent in Naples is published.
Bell¿ngcat did excellent research and the article on Maria Adela Kuhfeldt Rivera (a false identity) really is worth reading. She posed as a jeweller (though pieces she offered seemed to come from China) to get access to society and hopefully meet NATO officers stationed in Naples. What „Der Spiegel“ promises with a big team in a cover story on „Putin’s saboteurs – How Putin’s agents undermine Germany“ becomes partly true as Adela was somebody’s agent next door („How good do you know your neighbour?“ a newsletter asks). It stimulates a vague feeling of danger and at the same time draws a line between possible agents and our everyday life. What is a remarkable piece of investigation by Bell¿ingcat shows how a certain kind of agents operate. It is not the overall picture from our perspective but it is a vital contribution to it. We need counterintelligence based on the degree of penetration of our countries by Russian intelligence – and this is about high-ranking politicians, military, economy, media, administration, intelligence services, NGOs etc. You’d bet „Der Spiegel“ and those journalists who admire their colleagues would not connect all the dots but continue to force the covert Russian agenda.
In the report below by „60 Minutes“ (Australia) Bell¿ingcat explains how movements of Russian agents with data traces nobody can avoid completely are reconstructed with intense efforts. And they mention that GRU agents are sent on missions to kill targeted indivuals especially with poison. After Darya Dugina was killed in a car bomb blast most speculations saw her father Alexander Dugin as the real victim who only escaped in the last minute by changing the car. Russian Expert Yuri Felshtinsky points at the hallmarks of a GRU execution as often family members are in the focus. Dugin (whose father was a GRU officer) has a reputation of being unruly, difficult and making enemies even in organisations he joined (see also this analysis of the „Moscow Times“). Felshtinsky says that several Gazprom managers and their relatives were the target of assassinations and assassination attempts as Gazprom has strong GRU ties. Gazprom was on board of Austrian construction company Strabag and has an office at Teinfaltstrasse/Löwelstrasse in Vienna close to the Social Democrats. Former chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer has KGB ties and is business partner of oligarch’s lawyer Leo Specht; until 2017 their office was in the same building as Gazprom’s (see photo here and some details explained). As far as Strabag is concerned in 2007 oligarch Oleg Deripaska (who by the way is accompanied by GRU) acquired shares and Gusenbauer in 2010 was elected chairman of the board of auditors. Strabag made deals with Vladimir Putin and oligarch Viktor Vekselberg as well and built among others the Olympic village for Sotchi 2014.
In 2018 Austria could no longer ignore tips of British intelligence that the retired officer Martin Möller had been a GRU spy in the defence ministry until 2013 and still working for them afterwards. Neither in his trial nor in media the situation in the ministry played a role although Norbert Darabos (minister from 2007 to 2013) was/is sealed off, under total surveillance and threatened (there is a US embassy cable of 2008 about Darabos published by Wikileaks with some interesting details). British diplomats say the ministry is so much undermined that it is practically a department of GRU. That Darabos by no means should dare to act like a minister according to the constitution was even expressed in a threat posting (in the newspaper „Die Presse“ whose editor Rainer Nowak is a friend of Gusenbauer and belongs to the Russian network). A cabinet chief „played minister“ illegally executing unlawful orders from Russian intelligence. He sealed the cabinet completely off against NATO and even ambassadors had to wait very long to speak to Darabos. Others could never talk to him and were threatened and smeared by the cabinet chief if they still thought the minister is the minister. When Darabos changed to Löwelstrasse in 2013 as a party manager – with the grip of the GRU nearby – the back row SPÖ politician Gerald Klug should play the minister statist role while still Russia ruled via cabinet chief. Media like „Kleine Zeitung“ (Michael Jungwirth see below is among their staff) were as usual Putin’s henchmen and portrayed Klug as „even of military appearance“ while Darabos in contrast was (of course not under pressure by Russian intelligence but) „not interested in the military“.
After „Der Spiegel“ published its story „Euronews“ reported about Russian large scale military espionage efforts in Germany. This is the task of Militärischer Abschirmdienst with the strange acronym MAD; this agency equals Abwehramt in Austria. AbwA never gave the strawman cabinet chief a security clearance and it at the same time never protected Darabos as the commander of the army. The former head of AbwA Ewald Iby confirmed many of my findings and gave several cryptic hints; he said that I’d never have any chance against „them“. I wanted to ask him if „they“ are Putin’s people and if he works for them but as he died of sudden heart failure I couldn’t talk to him again. Then he was the deputy of AbwA chief Rudolf Striedinger who later became head of the Pandemic coordination on state level and is now chief of general staff. Striedinger had to cover that Airbus was attacked via Austrian defence ministry on behalf of Russian interests. It comes to no surprise that the Club de Berne deeply mistrusts Austrian intelligence forces; another example is involvement in the Wirecard affair affecting politicians, army and police and tied to the Russian network. A new piece of „The Insider“ investigates GRU failures might remind us that they got secret OPCW documents on Novichok thanks to Jan Marsaleks contacts in Austria.
„Der Spiegel“ focuses on Russians instead of unveiling domestic persons helping an enemy power to achieve its goals. To some degree this might be useful as common people are not aware of techniques of manipulation that could be applied to them or how to recognize a cover story. At the same time it diverts attention from three pretty raw categories of domestic helpers: perspective agents (who climbed up the ladder slowly and sometimes faster), supporters (entrepreneurs, philantropists etc. who are fully aware that they cooperate with Russian intelligence; they give tips whom to recruit) and useful idiots (who are unaware of the true nature of the cause they support and may achieve more in their naivety as a perspective agent). To make the picture complete some folks realize something must be wrong and are distracted, attacked from behind or set under pressure. There is an immense lack of awareness of manipulation methods and how easy it is to lure many of us into a trap when triggered. As Bezmenov once described it the perception of reality is constantly changed in a proces of demoralization (followed by a period of destabilization, then crisis and then normalization in a new normality). Without the ability to stick to reality and being conditioned emotionally via stimulus and reward people can’t understand proven facts any more. They cheer politicians with known ties to Russia and China who did everything to create a crisis but are presented as saviours in mass media.
PS: I have been in the Green Party for a certain amount of time where I witnessed that it was taken away from us – ordinary people who wanted better politics. There was an undercurrent of hidden influence but it was taboo to speak about it, to confront those standing for it. I realized that the party was instrumentalized by an intelligence agency (a hostile takeover) and attribued it among others to the long time Member of Parliament Peter Pilz and the present Austrian President Alexander van der Bellen. Having so experienced a (Russian) intelligence front (there are many) I know how hard it is to resist as you need others who realize it and are not cheated, manipulated and pacified again in the next moment. My blog is pouring out many verifiable details on a complex picture with the characteristics of Russian intelligence operations. As Bezmenov once said demoralized people don’t react to authentic proof but I continue showing it to them….
Diese Recherchen erfordern sehr viel Aufwand und sind in dieser Form einzigartig. Es ist immer notwendig, alles neu zu bewerten und weitere Puzzleteile zu einem sehr komplexen Bild hinzuzufügen. Davon profitiert jeder, der mit einzelnen Bereichen in Berührung gekommen ist oder der sich fragt, wie etwas einzuordnen ist. Als Grundlage für weitere Recherche, für parlamentarische Untersuchungen, für Ermittlungen der Justiz eignet es sich auch sehr gut. Es kommt oft darauf an, durch Zufall an eine mögliche Verbindung überhaupt mal zu denken, um sie und einiges mehr zu finden.
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Alexandra Bader, Erste Bank, AT 592011100032875894 BIC GIBAATWWXXX
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